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The Transduction of Distinctive Features at the
Phonology–Phonetics Interface
Veno Volenec & Charles Reiss
We propose that the interface between phonology and phonetics is medi-
ated by a transduction process that converts elementary units of phono-
logical computation, features, into temporally coordinated neuromuscular
patterns, called ‘True Phonetic Representations’, which are directly inter-
pretable by the motor system of speech production. Our view of the in-
terface is constrained by substance-free generative phonological assump-
tions and by insights gained from psycholinguistic and phonetic models
of speech production. To distinguish transduction of abstract phonologi-
cal units into planned neuromuscular patterns from the biomechanics of
speech production usually associated with physiological phonetics, we
have termed this interface theory ‘Cognitive Phonetics’ (CP). The inner
workings of CP are described in terms of Marr’s (1982/2010) tri-level ap-
proach, which we used to construct a linking hypothesis relating formal
phonology to neurobiological activity. Potential neurobiological correlates
supporting various parts of CP are presented. We also argue that CP aug-
ments the study of certain phonetic phenomena, most notably coarticula-
tion, and suggest that some phenomena usually considered phonological
(e.g., naturalness and gradience) receive better explanations within CP.
Keywords: phonology–phonetics interface; Cognitive Phonetics; distinc-
tive features; transduction; neurobiology of language
1. Introduction
This paper aims to elucidate the nature of a cognitive system that takes as its input a
representation consisting of distinctive features (i.e., the output of the phonological
module) and generates a representation directly interpretable by the neuromuscu-
lar system associated with speech production. This system we will call ‘Cognitive
Phonetics’ and the representations it generates ‘True Phonetic Representations’.1
This paper draws on both the phonological and phonetic literature. Unsurprisingly, as gener-
ative linguists, our interpretation of these two traditions conflicts rather sharply with that of
more phonetically oriented scholars. Thanks to the critical comments of two such reviewers,
we have tried to clarify our assumptions and inferences about both phonetics and phonology.
Even if these perspectives remain incommensurable, we hope to have made the sources of
disagreement and incompatibility more evident in light of the reviews we received.
1 The way we use the term ‘representation’ here is slightly different than is customary in gener-
ative linguistics, where a representation is taken to be an abstract characterization of implicit
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Here we will concentrate solely on speech (pre)production, leaving the perceptual
direction of this system aside whenever possible. In line with the theme of this vol-
ume, our inquiry is a resuscitation of certain proposals made by Eric Lenneberg 50
years ago (see section 2), recast in the modern biolinguistic research program advo-
cated by David Poeppel and colleagues as an attempt to unify theoretical linguistics
and cognitive neuroscience.
Our point of departure is a fairly well-established claim: Surface (also known
as ‘phonetic’ or ‘output’) representations of the phonological component of a gen-
erative grammar are matrices of distinctive features (where columns represent seg-
ments).2 During most of the 1960s, it was usually assumed that the features of
underlying and surface representations are entities of a different kind, the former
being binary, the latter gradual scales (Chomsky & Halle 1968: 297). However,
one aspect of Postal’s (1968) ‘naturalness condition’—the statement that a surface
representation is identical (and therefore composed from the same set of represen-
tational elements) to its underlying representation except as requested otherwise by
phonological rules—seems to have been, often tacitly, adopted over the following
decades, after a brief period of uncertainty. Thus in early 1970s, in an influential
compendium on the contemporary issues in phonological theory, Maran (1973),
discussing classificatory (phonological) and phonetic features, concluded that
[w]e do not, however, claim at this stage that the set of abstract phono-
logical features is identical in membership to the set of phonetic fea-
tures. There are many things which remain unclear. (Maran 1973: 73)
But already by the late 1970s a consensus seems to have emerged that underlying
and surface representations do consist of the same vocabulary of features:
Assuming that utterances are best represented as a string of feature ma-
trixes at the phonetic level, we can raise the question of how sounds are
represented for the purpose of phonological description (i.e., in the UR
and at all intermediate levels). [. . . ] [A] fundamental tenet of generative
phonology has been that sounds are most properly represented at these
levels in the same way they are phonetically—namely, as feature ma-
trixes in which each feature describes an articulatory and/or acoustic
property of the sound. (Kenstowicz & Kisseberth 1979: 239)
If we assume that URs and SRs belong to the same cognitive module, that is, the
phonological module, and if we assume that a ‘module’ may operationally be de-
fined as an encapsulated computational system that operates over a particular kind
of abstract units (Boeckx 2009: 125–127), if follows that all levels of phonological
linguistic knowledge. We use the term in a broader sense, as a scientific abstraction in general,
similar to how H2O ‘represents’ water in formal stating of chemical processes. The main dif-
ference between a surface representation and a true phonetic representation, as will be shown
in greater detail in section 4, is that the former represents knowledge (competence), and the
latter represents information feeding speech production. This more general sense of usage
is in line with Marr’s (1982/2010: 20) definition of ‘representation’ as “a formal system for
making explicit certain entities or types of information together with a specification of how
the system does this”.
2 Other data structures have been proposed, such as the feature geometry trees of Sagey (1986)
and related work, but the simpler feature matrix structure is sufficient for our discussion.
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representation are built from the same set of primitives (Hale & Kissock 2007: 83).
Thus the output of the phonological module, the surface representation, also con-
sists of matrixes of distinctive features.
We understand distinctive features here as a particular kind of substance-free
units of mental representation, neither articulatory nor acoustic in themselves, but
rather having articulatory and acoustic correlates, as Halle (1983/2002: 108–109) and
Reiss (2018, chapter 15.7) have pointed out. Many influential phonological texts
have stated over the last several decades that features serve as a bundle of informa-
tion that the brain sends to the articulators (if speech is the chosen modality). Here
are three examples of such statements:
In articulatory terms each feature might be viewed as information the
brain sends to the vocal apparatus to perform whatever operations are
involved in the production of the sound, while acoustically a feature
may be viewed as the information the brain looks for in the sound wave
to identify a particular segment as an instance of a particular sound.
(Kenstowicz & Kisseberth 1979: 239)
[. . . ] [T]he distinctive features correspond to controls in the central ner-
vous system which are connected in specific ways to the human motor
and auditory systems. [. . . ] In producing speech, instructions are sent
from higher centers in the nervous system to the different feature boxes
in the middle part of (5) [’tone’, ’vocal’, ’labial’ etc.—vv & cr] about the
utterance to be produced. (Halle 1983/2002: 109)
The [. . . ] featurally specified representation constitutes the format that
is both the endpoint of perception - but which is also the set of instruc-
tions for articulation. (Poeppel & Idsardi 2011: 179)
If one thinks about how exactly features engage the articulatory system, it becomes
apparent that there is a substantial conceptual gap between features and neural
structures or activities. At present there is no way to link either the general concept
‘distinctive feature’ or any of the particular features (e.g., [CORONAL]) to any known
neural structure (e.g., dendron, neuron, cortical column etc.) or activity (e.g., long
term potentiation, oscillation, synchronization etc.; see Embick & Poeppel 2015). In
fact, there seems to be very little understanding of how the brain exactly represents
and computes any of the units or processes that are part of linguistic competence
(Chomsky 2000a; Gallistel & King 2010; Mausfeld 2012). In other words, the units
of linguistic computation and the units of neurological computation—as currently
understood—are mostly incommensurable. This problem was therefore dubbed
‘the ontological incommensurability problem’ by Poeppel & Embick (2005). The
proposed solution to it is to decompose a particular linguistic domain (e.g., phonol-
ogy) into formal units and operations that are as basic and as generic as possible,
and then formulate biologically plausible and scientifically productive ‘linking hy-
potheses’ across the fields of linguistics and neuroscience (Poeppel & Embick 2005,
Poeppel 2012, Embick & Poeppel 2015).
The main goal of this paper is to formulate a hypothesis about the ‘intermod-
ular bridge’ (Pylyshyn 1984: 147) from the symbolic and substance free (phonology)
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to the physical and substantive (phonetics). By pursuing this line of inquiry a mod-
est attempt is made to formulate a theory of the phonology–phonetics interface3 in
strict biolinguistic terms, that is, in such a fashion that it can be linked to the kind of
neurobiological activity that we might plausibly find in a neuromuscular system.
Distinctive feature theory was initially outlined by Roman Jakobson in a lecture
delivered in 1928 (see Jakobson 1971: 3–6) and in an often overlooked paper from
the late 1930s (Jakobson 1939), and subsequently elaborated by Jakobson, Fant &
Halle (1952) and Jakobson & Halle (1956). The idea of a ‘distinctive feature’ was
founded upon purely phonological—that is, non-biological and non-cognitive—
insights about phonemic oppositions in the vein of Trubetzkoy (1939/1969), as
shown in the following passage:
Any minimal distinction carried by the message confronts the listener
with a two-choice situation. Within a given language each of these op-
positions has a specific property which differentiates it from all the oth-
ers. The listener is obliged to choose either between two polar qualities
of the same category, such as grave vs. acute, compact vs. diffuse, or be-
tween the presence and absence of a certain quality, such as voiced vs.
unvoiced, nasalized vs. non-nasalized, sharpened vs. non-sharpened (plain).
The choice between the two opposites may be termed distinctive feature.
The distinctive features are the ultimate distinctive entities of language
since no one of them can be broken down into smaller linguistic units.
The distinctive features combined into one simultaneous or [. . . ] con-
current bundle form a phoneme. (Jakobson, Fant & Halle 1952: 2)
Despite many revisions of the theory during the following decades (e.g., Chom-
sky & Halle 1968: 298–329, Halle & Clements 1983, Clements 1985, Clements &
Hume 1995), it stands to reason that distinctive feature theory was never meant
to face one of the more difficult questions of modern biolinguistics and of cogni-
tive neuroscience in general, namely, how to bridge the gap between a cognitive
faculty, in this case phonological competence partly represented by features, and
brain. The existence of features themselves should not be in question—they have
withstood almost a century of rational and empirical scrutiny and are considered
“to be a scientific achievement on the order of the discovery and verification of
the periodic table in chemistry” (Jackendoff 1994: 60). Also clear is the fact that fea-
tures are somehow interpreted by the sensorimotor (SM) system because utterances
are effectively externalized and perceived/parsed. Therefore, a question that logi-
cally follows from these facts is how exactly to get from discrete, timeless, abstract
cognitive entities (features), on the one hand, to temporally arranged articulatory
movements and ultimately to continuously varying sound waves, on the other.
Here we will adopt the position that cognition, including linguistic cogni-
tion, is best understood as a set of modules (see Chomsky 1984 and Curtiss 2013
for justification), each of which is characterized by mappings involving inputs and
outputs in a particular format (Reiss 2007, section 2.1). Modules are connected
3 An influential source on this topic is the collection of papers in the special issue of the Journal
of Phonetics (1990) dedicated to the relationship between phonetics and phonology. In the
course of this paper, we will address what we consider as some shortcomings of these previous
discussions of the phonology–phonetics interface.
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via ‘interfaces’—configurations in which the outputs of one module serve as the
inputs to another module. We argue that the interface between the phonological
component of the grammar and phonetics (in this case starting with the neuro-
phonetics of speech production, that is, with sending efferent neural commands
to speech organs) is mediated by a system that transduces features into True Pho-
netic Representations—arrays of temporally coordinated neuromuscular informa-
tion directly interpretable by the motor system in charge of speech production. An
assumption that is interleaved in this proposal is that distinctive features, as cur-
rently conceived in modern literature, are not directly intelligible to the SM system.
It is a non-trivial matter to show why this is so, and we return to this issue in sec-
tion 3. Thus, our research question is that of transduction of distinctive features
at the phonology–phonetics interface, which necessarily precedes speech produc-
tion. A convenient and productive way to fractionate this question and begin to
approach it is to adopt Marr’s (1982/2010) three level perspective that specifies—
for any cognitive information-processing system—its computational level (‘What
is computed and why?’), algorithmic level (‘How is it computed?’), and implemen-
tational level (‘How is it realized physically?’). It should be noted that these three
levels of analysis do not state some fundamental truth about cognitive systems in
general (e.g., that every cognitive system consists of three levels); rather, these are
explanatory devices that provide a convenient way of dividing a cognitive system
in order to study it, or in Marr’s (1982/2010: 24) words, these are “the different
levels at which an information-processing device must be understood before one
can be said to have understood it completely”. Since the cognitive system under
study is an information-processing device, we will frame our discussion in Marr’s
terms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we revisit Lenne-
berg’s (1967) Chapter Three where he introduces abstract neuromuscular schemata
to account for the transformation of basic phonological units, segments in his case,
into muscular events. In section 3, we state in more detail some general proper-
ties of Cognitive Phonetics, our proposed interface theory; we show how it can
be constrained by both phonological and phonetic considerations; and we provide
arguments for why features need to be transduced before a representation can be
legible to the SM system. In section 4, we define the transduction of features into
True Phonetic Representations following Marr’s (1982) tri-level approach and we
explore its neurobiological substrate. In section 5, we pursue several direct conse-
quences of viewing the phonology–phonetics interface this way and introduce the
concept of ‘intrasegmental coarticulation’. We conclude (section 6) by summarizing
our results and by pointing out some further research strategies that follow directly
from our insights.
2. Lenneberg’s Neuromuscular Schemata
Lenneberg (1967: 89–90) was well aware of the complexity of the relationship be-
tween discrete, logically ordered phonological units (phonemes, segments) on the
one hand, and continuous articulatory movements with concomitant acoustic re-
sults on the other. He recognized that although some acoustic discontinuities cor-
responding to segment transitions are detectable in a spectrogram, in general, these
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boundaries are not apparent, and the acoustic record of speech provides very lim-
ited information about phonological organization. This complexity is of course
mirrored in speech production, since discrete sequences of segments correspond to
continuous movements of physical systems: “[w]hen we think of the entire mus-
culature of the speech apparatus in activity, we realize that there is a continuous
waxing and waning in states of contraction throughout these muscles” (Lenneberg
1967: 90). The relation between phonological units and articulatory movements is
further complicated by various directions, scopes and types of segmental coarticu-
lation: “[t]he muscular activity associated with one phoneme is influenced by the
phonemes that precede and follow it” (Lenneberg 1967: 92). As was already under-
stood at that time (O¨hman 1966, 1967), and as subsequent research has confirmed
(Hardcastle & Hewlett 1999), coarticulation is a ubiquitous phenomenon that oblit-
erates the neat, beads-on-a-string-like succession of phonological segments. A fur-
ther problem that Lenneberg emphasized is that the order and duration of events
at different levels of phonetic organization—perceptual, acoustic, neural—are not
perfectly aligned:
The perceptual order of speech sounds need not be identical with the
order of acoustic correlates (we may ignore or fail to hear certain acous-
tic phenomena); the order of acoustic events need not be identical with
the order of motor or articulatory events (movements occur that do not
produce sound or sound-changes); the order of central neuronal events
may be different from the order of peripheral motor events (certain ner-
vous impulses must be initiated in advance of others because travel-
ing time to the periphery is longer for some pathways [e.g., the recur-
rent nerve supplying the muscles of the larynx—vv & cr] than others
[e.g., the trigeminal nerve innervating the muscles of the jaw—vv &
cr]). (Lenneberg 1967: 93)
Lenneberg’s discussion illustrates how segmental units of surface represen-
tations radically differ from their realizations. The former are discrete, timeless,
neatly ordered mental abstractions, the latter continuous, dynamic, overlapping,
coordinated movements of respiratory, phonatory and articulatory organs. The
magnitude of this mismatch is even greater when we take into account the tremen-
dous complexity of the neuromuscular mechanisms by which mental representa-
tions are realized. The production of speech is the most complex neuromuscular ac-
tivity human beings ever come to master, requiring temporal coordination of over
100 muscles controlled by more than 1400 motor commands per second (Stetson
1951, Lenneberg 1967: 91–92, Laver 1994: 1). Stated this way, it becomes apparent
that the mental unit represented as [t] on the one hand, and the sound of producing
that unit on the other, are separated by a considerable gap. The problem, then, is
to explicitly relate the two sides, taking into account their fundamentally different
natures.
Lenneberg (1967: 98–107) proposed a two-step process which, essentially,
transmutes segments into real-time muscular activity. A few caveats are due before
sketching his proposals. First, Lenneberg’s discussion is based on the production
of idealized utterances. His examples are not drawn from observed speech, but
are models of the process of speech production applied to hypothetical tokens. A
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related second point is that Lenneberg’s proposal is not intended as part of a psy-
cholinguistic theory of language use, what is sometimes called a ‘psychologically
real’ model of speech production. Similar to the components of Marr’s (1982) tri-
level analysis, the components of Lenneberg’s model are “theoretical stages that
help us visualize the complications of speech production” (Lenneberg 1967: 99).
Third, Lenneberg takes segments, not distinctive features, to be the basic phono-
logical units, and uses a traditional structuralist terminology—‘phonemes’ for ab-
stract segmental distinctive units, ‘phones’ for their intended realizations. One of
our primary goals in this paper is to show how Lenneberg’s insights can be further
developed by combining them with a finer level of phonological representation us-
ing distinctive features.
Lenneberg’s model, as shown in Figure 1, takes a string of phones as its input
and applies two operations: (1) it assigns muscle activity to each phone; (2) it orders
that muscle activity temporally.
Figure 1: Diagram of hypothetical transduction processes involved in speech production. Based on
Lenneberg (1967: 99).
Both medial processes of Figure 1 may be represented in a form of a schema.
Lenneberg represented the assignment of muscle activity to each phone with a table
where columns stand for successive phones, and rows for muscles relevant for their
production (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Schema of the process of assigning
muscle activity to a string of phones. Based on
Lenneberg (1967: 100).
This schema is intended as a ma-
trix indicating which muscles are to be
contracted in order to produce a given
speech sound. Rows correspond to spe-
cific muscles (abstractly labeled from a
to f ), columns to phones; ‘+’ means con-
traction of a given muscle, ‘0’ means re-
laxation. For example, the schema in
Figure 2 indicates that in order to pro-
duce phone IV it will be necessary to
contract muscles b, c, d, e. Naturally,
in actual cases of realization of phones,
many more muscles are involved. The
next step in transduction is to order
muscular activity from Figure 2 tempo-
rally. This process is illustrated in Figure 3. A simplifying assumption is that the
relevant muscles may be grouped into classes, here denoted as α through δ, ranked
according to the time it takes neural impulses to travel from the brain stem and to
reach the muscles in each class. Thus the α class of muscles has an activation la-
tency that is four times greater than the δ class, three times greater than G, and two
times greater than B.
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Figure 3: Schema of the process of temporal ordering of muscle activity
for a given string of phones. Based on Lenneberg (1967: 101).
A further sim-
plification is that in
this schema all phones
are assumed to be of
equal duration.4 Based
on the classification of
relevant muscles into
latency groups, shown
in the left table of Fig-
ure 3, the schema from
Figure 2 is rearranged
to obey this relative
temporal order. The
table on the right in
Figure 3 shows that if
a string of phones I to VI is to be realized correctly, then the first neuromuscular
event to occur is the firing of impulses for contraction of muscle e; after that mus-
cles b and c contract but e relaxes, and so on. Due to temporal shifting of the muscles
associated with particular phones, the columns in this schema can no longer be put
into one-to-one correspondence with the segments in the phonological string. It
is here that the phonemic ’Easter eggs’ are smashed (Hockett 1955: 210) and coar-
ticulatory effects begin to emerge.5 Therefore, each column in the right schema of
Figure 3 corresponds to a ‘temporal segment’ which indicates, for a given point in
time, which muscles need to be contracted or relaxed. Unfortunately, Lenneberg
does not discuss the details of this temporal arrangement. For example, he leaves
unresolved the question of how much time does one cell denote—5 ms, 10 ms, 20
ms? Time is represented abstractly in Figure 3, from 1 to 9, a reflection of the hy-
pothetical and tentative nature of his discussion, that is, “merely stat[ing] what the
neuronal firing order is on some given level in the brain” (Lenneberg 1967: 102).
The result of both steps in the transduction of phones into a neuromuscu-
lar schema is given in Figure 4. For each unit of time (abstractly denoted here
4 This is a curious assumption/simplification on Lenneberg’s behalf since four pages prior to
describing the transduction of segments into neuromuscular schemata he discusses timing
problems arising from differences in segmental duration (cf. Lenneberg 1967: 96–97). In fact,
temporal discrepancies on various levels of phonetic organization are what initially prompted
him to devise such a model of transduction.
5 The corresponding quote referenced here is as follows:
Imagine a row of Easter eggs carried along a moving belt; the eggs are of various
sizes, and variously colored, but not boiled. At a certain point, the belt carries
the row of eggs between the two rollers of a wringer, which quite effectively
smash them and rub them more or less into each other. The flow of eggs before
the wringer represents the series of impulses from the phoneme source; the mess
that emerges from the wringer represents the output of the speech transmitter.
At a subsequent point, we have an inspector [i.e., a hearer—vv & cr] whose task
it is to examine the passing mess and decide, on the basis of the broken and un-
broken yolks, the variously spread-out albumen, and the variously colored bits
of shell, the nature of the flow of eggs which previously arrived at the wringer.
Note that he does not have to try to put the eggs together again—a manifest
physical impossibility—but only to identify. (Hockett 1955: 210)
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as a temporal segment), the schema specifies which muscle needs to contract and
across how many such units, that is, for how long. Within each column, events are
assumed to be simultaneous. Notice that for example aI in the fourth temporal seg-
ment, which is a muscle contraction associated with the phone ordered first in the
string of Figure 2, is preceded by four muscle contractions unrelated to that phone
(bII, bIII, cII, cIII).
Figure 4: A neuromuscular schema as a result
of transduction of a string of phones into infor-
mation directly interpretable by the SM system.
Based on Lenneberg (1967: 102).
The anticipation of future events
emphasizes the need for a model of
speech preproduction that feeds the
sensorimotor system with “a hierar-
chic plan in which events are selected
[. . . ] as an integration of all elements
within units of several seconds dura-
tion” (Lenneberg 1967: 103). For rea-
sons discussed at length (see especially
Lenneberg 1967: 102–107), Lenneberg
on page 106 explains that a ‘sequen-
tial chain model’ that scans the surface
representation from ‘left to right’, in-
terpreting linearly ordered segments, is
not a viable model for relating phonology to phonetics. Instead, what is needed
is a ‘central plan model’ of speech preproduction, which Lenneberg described as
follows:
On the lowest level, muscular contractions belonging to different speech
sounds intermingle and therefore their sequencing cannot be programm-
ed without considering the order of the speech sounds to which they
belong. But the choice and sequencing of speech sounds cannot take
place without knowledge of the sequence of morphemes to which the
sounds belong. [Compare the two different pronunciations of the arti-
cle the depending on whether the following morpheme begins with a
consonant or a vowel—vv & cv] [. . . ] On the next higher level, the level
of morphemes, we encounter again the phenomenon of intermingling
of elements and an impossibility to plan the sequence without insight
into the syntactic structure of higher constituents. [. . . ] On a still higher
level, the level of immediate constituents, [. . . ] syntactic elements can-
not be ordered without knowledge of the entire sentence. (Lenneberg
1967: 106)
The need for a hierarchical central plan for speech production is thus just a specific
example of a more general requirement for all levels of linguistic computation and
behavior, a requirement that probably extends into other behavioral domains such
as navigating through space.
In summary, Lenneberg (1967, chapter 3) already recognized the complexi-
ties involved in transforming a mental representation of a string of phones into a
temporally coordinated sequence of muscular contractions. The result of this trans-
duction may be understood as a neuromuscular schema such as given in Figure 4.
The sequential arrangements of muscular events require preplanning with antici-
pation of later events. Therefore, the occurrence of some events is contingent upon
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other events yet to come, which may be adduced as proof that sequencing on a neu-
romuscular level is not accomplished by a sequential chain model (i.e., by scanning
and interpreting a string of segments), but rather by a complex central plan model.
The observed interdigitation of muscular correlates of a given phone is mirrored on
higher levels of organization, for which a central plan model is also required. The
importance of Lenneberg’s work, foundational to biolinguistics, derives from his
capacity to invoke and synthesize concepts and results from domains as diverse as
phonology, phonetics, physiology and neurology.
3. Phonology–Phonetics Interface (PPI)
One of the points that emerged from the previous discussion is that relating phonol-
ogy and phonetics is a non-trivial and complex task. Lenneberg’s views were gen-
erally a step in the right direction because he understood the need to explicitly ad-
dress the conceptual gap between the units and operations characteristic of these
two systems. Yet, there is room for further improvement by adopting ideas and
findings that were mostly unavailable in the 1960s. In particular, the discussion of
the phonology–phonetics interface (PPI) can be constrained from ‘both sides’, that
is, by strictly adopting a constrained phonological theory which feeds the interface
in production (section 3.1), and by using insights from modern models of speech
production which are fed by this interface (section 3.2).
3.1. Phonology
On the phonological side, we assume a generative substance-free approach (Hale &
Reiss 2000a, 2000b, 2008, Reiss 2018, Bale & Reiss 2018). Phonology is understood
here as a component of the language faculty that involves formal computations
over discrete symbolic units such as distinctive features, syllables, feet etc. Since
phonology is a part of the knowledge of language, by definition “all the work in
phonology is internal to the mind/brain” (Chomsky 2012: 48). Furthermore, repre-
sentations involved in phonology are abstract and symbolic, that is, devoid of artic-
ulatory, acoustic, typological, statistical etc. information; computations involved in
phonology treat features and other phonological units as arbitrary symbols (Hale
& Reiss 2008: 169). All representational levels of the phonological component of a
generative grammar—underlying, surface, and intermediate—consist of distinctive
features (and perhaps markers of other segmental and suprasegmental structure,
such as syllable or foot boundaries, which need not detain us here). This means
that features are part of the ‘representational alphabet’ of the phonological module.
Representational levels are related by ordered phonological rules which serve as
the computational aspect of phonology (Vaux 2008).
It is important to distinguish between computation and transduction. Com-
putation is the formal manipulation (reordering, regrouping, deletion, addition,
etc.) of representational elements within a module, and without a change in the
representational alphabet. Transduction is a process of converting an element in
one form into a distinct form, that is, a mapping between dissimilar formats. For
example, in the process of hearing, air pressure differentials are transduced into
biomechanical vibrations of the tympanic membrane and the ossicles of the middle
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ear, which are transduced via the oval window into fluidic movements within the
cochlea, which are in turn transduced by the organ of Corti into electrical signals
which are passed on for further processing in the nervous system. The distinc-
tion between computation and transduction facilitates conceptualizing the notion
of modularity. A module can be thought of as a device which takes input rep-
resentations and computes over them, generating thereby an output in the same
representational alphabet. Modules of the mind (and of organic systems more gen-
erally) are linked by transducers which convert information in one form into a form
required by the computational module fed by the conversion process. An interface
between modules is therefore defined by (1) the form of the input, (2) the form of
the output, and (3) a set of transformations that relate (1) to (2).
By virtue of the form of its representations and operations, each module im-
poses ‘legibility conditions’ at its interfaces: If some information is to be legible
to a given module, that information must come in a specific form in which that
module operates (Chomsky 2000a: 9–14). Otherwise, that information would ei-
ther not be received by that module at all or would be treated as noise (perhaps
as human speech is noise to dogs which lack the needed cognitive modules and
transducers, even though their auditory system is far superior to that of humans).6
The SM system imposes certain legibility conditions on phonology, the component
of the grammar with which it interfaces, most notably the condition that informa-
tion must have a linear arrangement (one cannot produce eleven words in parallel)
with certain temporal properties (one cannot produce a polysyllabic word in three
nanoseconds). Linearity is a complex notion (see Cairns & Raimy 2011, Idsardi
& Raimy 2013). For example, in phonological representations, several tiers may
be distinguished (segmental, moraic, prosodic, etc.), leading to a kind of multi-
linearity characteristic for autosegmental phonology; also, in speech, many over-
lapping articulatory events may be detected, as will be shown in more detail in
section 4. Nonetheless, the general idea of linearity, namely, that sequential order-
ing and precedence relations among basic units play an important role, seems to
hold for both phonology and phonetics, unlike for syntax (Chomsky 1995: 334–340,
Everaert et al. 2015). Another condition, to which we will return in more detail
below, is the condition of bi-directionality: If the same phonological architecture is
to be employed in both language comprehension and in speaking, that is, if it is not
the case that humans use completely different grammatical devices for each direc-
tion,7 then the atomic representational units of phonology, features, must integrate
acoustic and articulatory correlates.8 If a feature were defined exclusively in terms
6 As Chomsky put it:
To be usable, the expressions of the language faculty (at least some of them),
have to be legible by the outside systems. So the sensorimotor system and the
conceptual-intentional system have to be able to access, to ‘read’ the expressions;
otherwise the system wouldn’t even know it is there. (Chomsky 2000b: 17)
7 In this context, consider Lashley: “The processes of comprehension and production of speech
have too much in common to depend on wholly different mechanisms” (Lashley 1951: 186).
8 A reviewer points out that it is possible that “the articulation system relies on sensory-motoric
knowledge to implement the auditory targets” and that features might not have direct articu-
latory correlates. Assuming non-existence of articulatory correlates of features is problematic
because it leads to the conclusion that if a speaker were to suddenly lose hearing, she or he
would have to become completely unable to articulate since there is no audition to guide ar-
262 V. Volenec & C. Reiss
of, say, its articulatory correlates, as the feature [CORONAL] is, then in principle such
a feature could not be used in phonological decoding.
In the phonological theory we adopt, features themselves are substance-free
cognitive units (see Reiss 2018: chapter 15.7 for justification), that is, they do not
contain information on the temporal coordination of muscle contractions, on the
spectral configuration of the acoustic target to be reached, and so on. Yet without
this information, the respiratory, phonatory and articulatory systems cannot pro-
duce speech. The motor system for speech production requires information about
substance and time in order to arrange the articulatory score, therefore this infor-
mation has to be integrated into a representation before being fed to the motor sys-
tem. The most plausible way to escape this deadlock (i.e., phonology is substance
free, but the SM system needs information about substance to produce speech) is to
abandon the idea of a direct, unmediated interface between grammar/phonology
and SM system, and posit a cognitive phonetic transduction system that converts
distinctive feature matrices into True Phonetic Representations that provide the SM
system with legible information needed to produce speech.
In summary:
• Outputs of the phonological module, surface representations (SRs) consisting
of substance-free features, do not contain substantial and temporal informa-
tion.
• The SM system requires articulatory, auditory and temporal information in
order to produce speech.
∴ SRs are not legible to the SM system and phonology cannot in principle
feed speech production directly.
∴ The interface between phonology and the SM system is mediated by
transduction.
Before turning to the nature of this transduction system, let us review how modern
models of speech production further constrain our approach to the PPI.
3.2. Speech Production
On the side of speech production, modern models such as DIVA (Guenther 1995a,
1995b, Guenther et al. 1998, 2006, Tourville & Guenther 2011, Guenther & Vladu-
sich 2012), HSFC (Hickok 2012), LRM (Levelt et al. 1999, Indefrey & Levelt 2004),
and MAPL (Poeppel & Idsardi 2011) provide several theoretical and empirical con-
straints on the nature of representations that directly feed the SM system during
speech. In constructing his model of transduction of phones into neuromuscular
schemata, Lenneberg (1967, chapter 3) made the assumption that this process in-
volves reaching specific articulatory targets and took into consideration only the
distribution of muscle contractions in time. However, more recent research showed
ticulation. It is known that a substantial decline in articulation can occur in such a case, but
not a complete inability to articulate (Cowie & Douglas-Cowie 1992, Lane et al. 1997). Also,
healthy speakers articulate intelligibly while their hearing is blocked by loud masking noise
(Lombard 1911, Lane & Tranel 1971). We therefore remain unconvinced that there are no ar-
ticulatory correlates of features.
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that these targets include auditory information as well. Speech production is a
mechanism in which feedforward and feedback processes are tightly and intricately
related, as witnessed by the general architecture of the Directions Into Velocities of
Articulators (DIVA) model, currently the most elaborate and empirically validated
model of speech production (see Figure 58.3 of Guenther & Hickok 2016: 728).
Manipulating a speaker’s auditory feedback during speech production results in
substantial compensatory changes in motor speech acts compared to undisturbed
speech (Yates 1963, Guenther et al. 1998, Houde & Jordan 1998, Larson et al. 2001,
Purcell & Munhall 2006, Hickok & Poeppel 2016, chapter 25, section 2.2.1). For
example, if a subject is asked to produce one vowel and the feedback that she or
he hears is manipulated so that it sounds like another vowel, then the subject will
change the vocal tract configuration so that the feedback sounds like the original
vowel. In other words, speakers will readily modify their articulations to hit an
auditory target, suggesting that the goal of speech production involves an intricate
relation between articulatory and auditory configurations. Furthermore, although
individuals who become deaf as adults can remain intelligible for years after they
lose their hearing, they show some speech production impairments immediately,
including the inability to adjust pitch and loudness in different listening condi-
tions, and over time they can exhibit substantial articulatory decline (Walstein 1990,
Perkell et al. 2000). The fact that speakers are able to repeat speech acts that they
heard, even when given speech acts are ad hoc inventions such as “zlurb”, sug-
gests that people effortlessly map between articulatory and auditory systems (see
the work on the Memory-Action-Perception Loop by Poeppel & Idsardi (2011) for
further discussion).
The Hierarchical State Feedback Control (HSFC) model (Hickok 2012) pro-
vides further corroboration for the view that features integrate both articulatory
and auditory information by showing that speech production involves parallel ac-
tivation of both auditory and motor units corresponding to the information pro-
vided by an appropriate mental representation, and also a sensory-motor coordi-
nate transform network mediating auditory and acoustic programs. It has been
well established that surface representations of the phonological module, spelled
out in terms of features, serve as both the starting point of speech production and
as the end-point of speech perception (Poeppel & Idsardi 2011, Idsardi & Mona-
han 2016). In an indirect manner, the groundwork for these findings was already
laid by the Motor Theory of Speech Perception (Liberman et al. 1967, Liberman
& Mattingly 1985), which posits that speech perception involves translating acous-
tic signals into motor gestures that produce them, and by the Acoustic Theory of
Speech Production (Fant 1960, Stevens 1998), which highlights the importance of
acoustic or auditory targets in the process of speech production. It follows logi-
cally from all this that distinctive features allow for mapping from auditory input
to words and from words to action, and therefore must properly be defined via
abstract articulatory and auditory correlates.
Modern neuropsychological and neurophysiological evidence indicates that
the cognitive aspect of externalizing language through speech has two distinct
stages, phonological and phonetic, lending further support for the necessity of cog-
nitive phonetics as a mediating system between phonology and the SM system. The
LRM model, named after its creators Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer (1999), explicates the
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successive stages of spoken word production, and clearly distinguishes between
cognitive phonological computation and cognitive phonetic encoding. Indefrey &
Levelt (2004) reviewed data from 82 imaging experiments and found that phono-
logical operations are independently conducted within the average time window of
205 ms, followed by an average of 145 ms of cognitive phonetic processing. Evidence
from aphasia also supports the dichotomy between phonological and phonetic cog-
nitive processing (Buchwald & Miozzo 2011, 2012). Consider the words pill and spill
in English. Both are assumed to contain the segment /p/ in their underlying rep-
resentations; in the surface representation the former has [ph] and the latter [p]. It
is of interest to determine what exactly happens when an aphasic patient simpli-
fies a consonant cluster so that /s/ does not get realized in a word like spill. Will
the resultant realization of /p/ be aspirated, consistent with the notion that the
deletion of /s/ occurred within the phonological module (i.e., before motor plans
for a cluster are implemented), or will it be produced without aspiration, reflecting
the conception that the phonological mapping /sp/→ [sp] was left intact and that
the deletion of the fricative occurred after phonological computation? Buchwald
& Miozzo (2011) measured VOT productions of two aphasic patients who did not
realize /s/ in /sp/, /st/, /sk/ clusters and compared these with realizations of
correctly produced consonants. Results showed two different patterns of produc-
tion, with one patient producing the initial stop consonant with a long VOT ([ph]),
and the other producing it with a short VOT ([p]). These findings have been taken
to suggest that the errors of the former patient were phonologically based and the
errors of the latter patient were phonetically based and “are consistent with an ac-
count of spoken production containing at least two processing levels that can be se-
lectively impaired by brain damage: one processing stage [i.e., cognitive phonologi-
cal] with context independent representations and another [i.e., cognitive phonetic]
with context-specific representations” (Buchwald & Miozzo 2011: 1118). Similar re-
sults emerged in examination of durational properties of nasal consonants when
deleted in /sn/ and /sm/ clusters (Buchwald & Miozzo 2012).
In summary, modern research into speech production, and to a lesser extent
speech perception, constrains our approach to the PPI insofar as it shows
(1) that the target of speech production is a complex representation that inte-
grates both articulatory and auditory information;
(2) that speech production is strongly influenced by auditory and somatosensory
feedback;
(3) that features have abstract articulatory and acoustic correlates, as demanded
by (1) and (2);
(4) that cognitive aspects of externalizing language through speech have two dis-
tinct stages: a substance-free computational stage (phonology) and a substan-
tial transduction stage (cognitive phonetics).
3.3. An Interface Theory: Cognitive Phonetics
Cognitive Phonetics (CP) is a theory of the phonology–phonetics interface (PPI). It
is motivated by the conceptual distance between the characteristics of phonology as
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Figure 5: The architecture of the phonology–phonetics interface and the place of Cognitive Phonetics
within it.
shown in section 3.1 on the one hand, and the characteristics of the speech produc-
tion mechanism as shown in section 3.2 on the other. CP proposes that the output
of the grammar is transduced into a representation that contains substance-related
information required by the SM system in order to externalize language through
speech. Figure 5 illustrates the general architecture of the PPI and the place of CP
within it.
Recall that our present focus on speech externalization, without discussion of
speech perception and phonological comprehension, is a matter of expository con-
venience, not a claim about the purview of CP. As the interface between phonology
and phonetics, CP is a bi-directional system, thus also relevant for transduction in
the direction of perception, that is, for decomposing, parsing, and mentally repre-
senting the sound of speech (Reiss 2007, section 2.5, Poeppel et al. 2008). Therefore,
in the ‘input’ direction, CP serves as “the bridge from the physical to the symbolic”
(Pylyshyn 1984: 152). In the ‘output’ direction, which is our focus here, CP is the
bridge from the symbolic to the physical, relating the substance-free (phonology)
to the substance-laden (physiological phonetics).
CP is fed by the output of the phonological grammar, and directly feeds the
sensorimotor (SM) system associated with speech production. CP is substance-
infusing in the sense that it provides the means to externalize language through
speech in real time using human neurophysiological machinery. The movements of
various organs and the subsequent acoustic consequences comprise the substance-
laden aspect of speech traditionally associated with articulatory and acoustic pho-
netics. CP is a transduction system, which means it changes inputs of one ontolog-
ical type into outputs of another. The input to CP is a mental representation com-
prised in part of abstract distinctive features. The output is a representation that
contains information on the auditory target to be reached, the muscles necessary
to realize a given input, and their temporal arrangement. Outputs of phonology
are interchangeably called in the literature ‘surface’ representations and ‘phonetic’
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representations, while representations from which these are derived are called ‘un-
derlying’ or ‘phonological’ representations (Kenstowicz 1994: 60). Since both are
phonological representations, that is, encoded in the primitives of the phonological
module, it is misleading to call only one representational level phonological. There-
fore, in line with our ideas regarding the PPI and CP, we propose a terminological
clarification. Inputs to phonology, typically conceived of as strings of concatenated
morphemes, we will call ‘underlying phonological representations’ (UPR); outputs
of phonology, which are the inputs CP, will be called ‘surface phonological repre-
sentations’ (SPR); and outputs of CP ‘true phonetic representations’ (TPR); or, for
short, ‘underlying representations’ (UR), ‘surface representations’ (SR), and ‘pho-
netic representations’ (PR), respectively. URs and SRs are part of phonology; PRs
are extragrammatical, non-phonological entities.
It is an understatement to say that progress in solving the ontological incom-
mensurability problem in all cognitive domains has been modest. In this light, the
fact that we are still talking about theoretical abstractions (e.g., PRs) and not solely
in terms of neurobiological processes does not reflect a commitment to any sort of
dualism. It reflects instead the position that theoretical cognitive models are cru-
cial for understanding neurobiology of any cognitive domain, including language
(Gallistel & King 2010, Poeppel 2012). However, provided that we decompose
models of various aspects of cognition—language and speech programing included
(Boeckx et al. 2014)—into elementary units and operations, it is a logical necessity
that for these units and operations to be ‘real’ in any coherent sense of that word,
they must have a neurobiological substrate, as reflected by Figure 5. For phonol-
ogy, works like Phillips et al. (2000), Binder et al. (2000), Hickok & Poeppel (2000a,
2004, 2007), Indefrey & Levelt (2004), Obleser et al. (2004), Mesgarani et al. (2008,
2014), Idsardi & Raimy (2013), Monahan et al. (2013), Idsardi & Monahan (2016)
provide information on what this substrate might be and how to look for it. For
neurobiological substrate of cognitive aspects of speech perception and production
see Hickok & Poeppel (2000b, 2016), Poeppel et al. (2008), Poeppel & Hackl (2008),
Poeppel & Monahan (2008), Poeppel & Idsardi (2011), Blumstein & Baum (2016),
Guenther & Hickok (2016), Tremblay et al. (2016). The neurobiological substrate
for CP will be explored in section 4.
CP shares its name and some conceptual commitments with the theory of
cognitive phonetics by Tatham (1984, 1987, 1990) and Morton (1987), although there
are substantial differences. While both approaches reject the notion of a direct inter-
face between phonology and phonetics, and argue for a cognitive approach to cer-
tain phonetic phenomena, their theory (henceforth ‘CP-TM’) offers a different view
of what phonology is and how it works. Although CP-TM was somewhat sym-
pathetic to contemporary developments in generative phonology (Tatham 1990,
section 3.1), the most important difference from our approach is that CP-TM did
not fully commit to the generative architecture of the human language faculty, and
therefore did not inherit all the implications (and results) that the generative frame-
work entails. In particular, while CP-TM acknowledges the existence and phonolog-
ical importance of features (ibid.), as soon as the phonetic level (albeit a cognitive
one) is reached, CP-TM, like most phonetic models, tacitly shift attention to the re-
alization of segments (Tatham 1990, section 6). In contrast, we are interested in de-
composing SRs into phonological primitives, features, and in exploring how these
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might be implemented neurobiologically in real time. A further difference is that
CP-TM has no commitments to neurobiology and keeps the discussion strictly in
the cognitive domain. In fact, CP-TM resolutely banishes neurobiological consider-
ations and maintains an “extreme dualist view” (Tatham 1990: 11).
The positing of a cognitive aspect of phonetics in no way blurs the compe-
tence/performance distinction. Phonology is competence; phonetics, even its cog-
nitive aspect, is performance by definition, since only mental grammar is defined
as competence. The transduction process modeled by CP (see section 4) does not
entail ‘knowledge’ (e.g., ‘knowing how’ to produce speech) in any useful sense of
the word (see Chomsky (1980: 101–102) for a relevant discussion on this matter).
Transduction of SRs into PRs entails a set of neuromuscular processes. Its ontoge-
netic development most likely follows the development of performance systems in
general (Lenneberg 1967, section 4.II). These processes are most properly conceived
as ‘automatic synergisms’, “whole trains of events that are preprogrammed and run
off automatically”, and that “form the basis of all motor phenomena in vertebrates”
(Lenneberg 1967: 92; see also Lorenz & Tinbergen 1957, 1970 for the seminal investi-
gation of innate egg rolling automatisms in greylag geese). That they are cognitive,
at least partially, despite being part of performance should also not be controver-
sial.9 CP by definition has access to cognitive representations generated by phonol-
ogy, as shown by the left portion of Figure 5, and it is in this respect that the epithet
‘cognitive’ is justified; what CP generates, phonetic representations (PFs), are in-
structions for the SM system on how to execute neuromuscular commands, which
are no longer cognitive. One of the main characteristics of a transducer is that it
changes the format of its input, and in our case the input is a cognitive entity.
4. The Inner Workings of CP: Transduction
In this section, we turn to the primary research question for Cognitive Phonetics
(CP): How are phonological features related to human neurobiological structures?
In other words, how can we bridge the symbolic and the physical in the domain of
speech? As we have indicated, this means exploring the structure of the transducer
that converts SR-type information into PR-type information. Clearly, our chances
of understanding a transducer are better if we have a good understanding of the
transducer’s inputs and outputs. The relatively robust results of generative phonol-
ogy, as compared with other domains of cognition, provide us with an anchor for
such explorations—we have a fairly explicit model of the nature of SR-type infor-
mation as linearly ordered strings of feature matrices. Models of comparable detail
are not available for the other two aspects of CP, the transduction procedures and
PR-type information, and it is to those topics that we now turn.
Marr’s (1982/2010) tri-level theory, which we will adopt in further discus-
sion, has been widely accepted as a means to gain insight into information process-
ing systems (IPS) such as CP. Marr proposes that IPSs are best analyzed in terms of
three conceptual levels, each corresponding to a specific set of questions. These lev-
els include the ‘computational level’, the ‘representational and algorithmic level’,
9 It should be noted that this is mostly a definitional matter; by ‘performance’ in this context we
merely mean ’not grammar’.
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and the ‘implementational level’ (Marr 1982/2010 22–27), defined by the following
questions:
• Computational level: What does the process do? Why does the process do it?
• Representational/algorithmic level: How does the process work? In particu-
lar, what are the input and output representations and what is the algorithm
for the transformation?
• Implementational level: How are the output representation and the algorithm
realized physically? In particular, what is the neurobiological substrate of the
mapping in question?
Before proceeding, let us clarify a confusing terminological ambiguity. The fact
that we are describing transduction, as distinct from computation, and yet still can
talk about the computational level of a transducer does not reflect an intellectual in-
consistency, but rather just two different uses of a term. As was stated in section
3.1, the main difference between a computational module and a transducer is that
the former is a mapping between entities in the same format (e.g., feature matri-
ces to feature matrices), and the latter is a mapping between entities of dissimilar
formats (e.g., feature matrices to muscle commands, or sound vibrations to neural
impulses). However, both modules and transducers are IPSs, therefore both are
amenable to Marr’s tri-level analysis, and both can be analyzed at the computational
level in Marr’s sense.
So, what implications does Marr’s theory have for our research question?
First, it calls for maximal conceptual decomposition of the representations and op-
erations posited by linguistics. For a long time, the cognitive neuroscience of lan-
guage was (and to a certain extent perhaps still is) focused on exploring the neuro-
biological correlates of rather complex linguistic entities or domains, such as syn-
tax (so for example, “Broca’s area underlies syntax” would be a common assertion
in such a tradition), phonology, lexical semantics, and so on (Poeppel 2012: 36–
49). However, Marr (1982/2010) argued that IPSs are best studied by decomposing
them into representational and computational primitives, and then by building a
bottom-up understanding of them. It is partly from this method that the success of
his theory of vision derives, and it is a success that has inspired much of the recent
work in computational neuroscience of language. Second, Marr’s theory encour-
ages us to seek an explanation for an IPS’s nature from several different sources (for
example, linguistics, cognitive science more broadly, neurobiology, formal compu-
tational theory) and facilitates explicitly connecting cognitive primitives with neu-
robiological structures. Therefore, it serves as a general framework for positing
linking hypotheses across the fields of linguistics and neurobiology.
4.1. The Computational Level
Let us now turn to defining transduction—the operational aspect of CP—at the
phonology–phonetics interface in terms of these three levels. Firstly, we want to
address the ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions of the computational level. What does
transduction in CP do? It transforms a representational format that is necessary for
the coding of phonological knowledge into a representational format adequate for
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instructing the neuromuscular system on what it must accomplish in articulatory
terms. Why does CP carry out transduction? In general, the answer to this question
follows directly from the theoretical and empirical considerations of section 3.1,
namely, that outputs of phonology, SRs consisting of substance-free features, lack
crucial substantial and temporal information and are thus not legible to the SM
system; therefore, phonology cannot in principle feed speech production directly,
but only through transduction. The very fact that phonology and phonetics con-
stitute two distinct domains that share an interface logically implies the necessity
of transduction between them. In the absence of CP, a mental expression could not
be externalized through the human SM system. The transduction maps between
properties of the mind—mental representations composed at the most basic level
of discrete, timeless, symbolic elements—and the functioning of the motor system,
which works in terms of gradual, dynamic, temporally arranged neuromuscular
activity. Since we do speak, the existence of transduction is confirmed.
4.2. The Representational and Algorithmic Level
We now turn to the question of how the transduction process works in CP.10 The
first step at this level is to state the representations involved in transduction. The
input representation, SR, is a matrix of distinctive features. Each feature is trans-
duced and receives interpretation by the SM system. Features are elementary units
of phonological computation, stored in long term memory, that represent articula-
tory and acoustic information in a highly abstract manner.11 Each feature may ab-
stractly be schematized as shown in Figure 6, which is an extension of the Memory-
Action-Perception Loop of Poeppel & Idsardi (2011). The input representation thus
involves a set of idealized acoustic targets at which the neuromuscular system will
aim, as corroborated by studies discussed in section 3.2, and a set of idealized ar-
ticulatory configurations needed to achieve these goals. It should be emphasized
that these ‘targets’ are not precise, physically invariant acoustic measurements, as
features are substance-free units; they are coarse mental representations of acoustic
spaces. It is a basic finding of psychoacoustic phonetics that what a speaker deems
a repetition of the same category may in fact reflect a wildly different acoustic signal
(Liberman 1957). The cognitive unity between acoustic and articulatory correlates
of features seems to be so strong that hearing the speech of another person excites
a corresponding motor program, regardless of whether the hearer has the intention
to also speak (Cooper & Lauritsen 1974, Fadiga et al. 2002).
10 Here we will make two simplifying assumptions. We will assume that features within a single
bundle (segment) are parts of an unordered and unstructured set and are not grouped hier-
archically so as to mimic the composition of the vocal apparatus. We will also abstract away
from the possibility, strongly suggested by evidence presented in Keating (1988) and Hale &
Kissock (2007), that featurally underspecified segments persevere into SRs. Integrating perse-
verant underspecification into CP will be left aside for future research.
11 It is doubtful that current expositions of the universal set of features in linguistic literature are
either quantitatively or qualitatively adequate. Compare, for example, Kenstowicz & Kisse-
berth (1979: 241–253), Lass (1984: 82–93), Katamba (1989: 42–51), Carr (1993: 54–66), Gussen-
hoven & Jacobs (2011: 74–84), Odden (2013: 45–61), Zsiga (2013: 258–270), etc., and notice the
tremendous differences in the total number of features, in the way they are classified, in the
set of features that made it to the final list, in the assumptions about n-arity, and especially in
their definitions.
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The output representation, called ‘True Phonetic Representation’, or ‘Pho-
netic Representation’ (PR) for short, is a complex array of neural commands that ac-
tivate muscles involved in speech production. As pointed out in section 2, uttering
even a single syllable involves hundreds of neuromuscular connections, therefore a
detailed description of every neuromuscular event for every single and interacting
feature is far beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 6: A schematization of a distinctive fea-
ture. Features serve as the cognitive basis of the
bi-directional translation between speech produc-
tion and perception, and are part of the long-
term memory representation for the phonological
content of morphemes, thus forming a memory-
action-perception loop (Poeppel & Idsardi 2011)
at the lowest conceptual level.
Our modest goal here is to sketch
the fate of a transduced feature in a few
simple and idealized cases. Take, for
example, the feature [+ROUND]. Since
lip rounding is known to have sys-
tematically varying muscular expres-
sion (due to interaction with other fea-
tures, to which we will return be-
low), the Phonetic Representation (PR)
has to allow for this variation across
contexts. The transduced form of
[+ROUND], call it PR[+ROUND], engages
at least four muscles: orbicularis oris,
buccinator, mentalis, levator labii superi-
oris. The idealized expression, assum-
ing no directly interfering articulatory
movements (a relatively rare case in ac-
tual speech), is simultaneous contrac-
tion of the superior and inferior parts
of orbicularis oris, contraction of mentalis
(for protruding the lower lip) and levator labii superioris (for protruding the upper
lip), and relaxation of buccinator. This is the case observed in pronouncing [u]. In
[y], on the other hand, PR[+ROUND] in addition to contracting the aforementioned
muscles also involves a compressing movement (lips drawn together horizontally)
caused by the contraction of the buccinator. The difference between protrusion and
compression in PR[+ROUND] is dependent on whether PR[+ROUND] is interacting with
PR[+BACK] or PR[–BACK] (Catford 1982: 172–173). Of course, various other compli-
cations exist, but this suffices to illustrate the general idea. The exact and fully
detailed characterization of PR[+ROUND] will thus be possible only after thoroughly
studying various possible interactions of transduced features, no doubt a massive
phonetic undertaking.
Note that PRs are still abstractly related to speech; they are not hi-fi encodings
of speech-sound articulations, although they are less abstractly related to speech
than SRs. This is because what is actually externalized is further complicated by
a great number of factors. As Hale & Kissock (2007: 85) point out, transduction is
followed by other performance factors that have no bearing on either grammar or
transduction, factors like speech rate, loudness, interruptions due to sneezing, and
many other situational effects. We will also have nothing to say here about how
other aspects of SRs (e.g., prosodic elements like tone) are transduced.
The algorithm that transforms SRs into PRs has two steps, echoing Lenneberg’s
(1967) proposals outlined in section 2. In the first step (A1), a feature is related to
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muscles which need to be contracted in order to produce an appropriate acoustic
effect. Since speech occurs in real time, the second step (A2) will entail tempo-
ral coordination of muscular activity demanded by A1. A tremendous amount of
complexity arises in relation to the second step of transduction. The main resultant
phenomenon of this step is coarticulation (see Hardcastle & Hewlett 1999, Farnetani
& Recasens 2013, and Volenec 2015 for surveys)—temporal overlapping of various
aspects of PRs. Neurobiological studies on speech perception have uncovered that
the human perceptual system consistently uses two time scales to analyze a con-
tinuous speech signal, a segmental time-frame of roughly 10–80 ms, and a syllabic
time-frame of 100–500 ms (Poeppel et al. 2008, Poeppel & Idsardi 2011, Chait et al.
2015):
There are two critically important chunk-sizes that seem universally in-
stantiated in spoken languages: segments and syllables. Temporal co-
ordination of distinctive features overlapping for relatively brief
amounts of time (10–80 ms) comprise segments; longer coordinated
movements (100–500 ms) constitute syllabic prosodies.
(Poeppel & Idsardi 2011: 182)
However, transduced features often ‘spill over’ these temporal borders, crossing
segmental and sometimes even syllabic boundaries in both directions, thus lead-
ing to coarticulation. Our decision to examine the transduction of [+ROUND] to
PR[+ROUND] is useful since this aspect of speech relies on several muscles and is
known to show great propensity for temporal overextending, especially in the an-
ticipatory direction. Lisker (1978: 133) states that “lip-rounding and nasalization
are segmental features of English that refuse to be contained within their ‘proper’
segmental boundaries, as these are commonly placed”. (Note that Lisker’s exam-
ple should not be specific to English if it derives from universal transducer prop-
erties.) Likewise, according to Benguerel & Cowan (1974) PR[+ROUND] may be evi-
dent several consonants in advance of the rounded vowel for which it is required:
In French, labial coarticulation can extend up to 6 segments in the anticipatory di-
rection. Lubker et al. (1975) showed, using electromyography, that in Swedish
PR[+ROUND] can start up to 600 ms ahead of a rounded vowel. Both directions of
temporal overextending of PR[+ROUND] are observed in English, as demonstrated by
Laver’s (1994: 321) clever example [hwudwtSwuzwpwôwunwdZwusw] (Who’d choose
prune juice?).
The neurobiological mechanisms underlying transduction algorithms are uni-
versal properties of the human species, as witnessed by the fact that humans, in all
non-pathological cases, use them without fail (see Dronkers 1996 for an example
of a pathological case demonstrating a disruption of A1). However, although the
transduction algorithms are biologically universal in humans, CP will still show
great output variability due to these two transduction steps being applied to SRs
that reflect featurally distinct utterances. Here it is critical to distinguish between
the status of the output of the transduction system (True Phonetic Representations)
and the system itself (Cognitive Phonetics): The output of the system is, trivially, I-
language-dependent because CP is fed by surface representations of that I-language
(more precisely then, the output is surface-representation-dependent); the system
itself is part of the human biological make-up and is therefore a universal property
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of the human species. Although this stance is somewhat controversial in phonet-
ics, in our view it is the only biolinguistically coherent approach to the study of
the PPI. The universality of CP is merely a reflection of the fact that there exists a
biological object we may call ’the phonetic implementational system’, of which CP
is one part and the SM system another. The question of whether there are vari-
ations in individual phonetic implementational systems among humans need not
detain us here, just as the fact that no two humans have identical eyes does not hin-
der biologists in studying a biological object called ’the human eye’. On the other
hand, rejection of language-specific phonetics in no way precludes the possibility
that certain sets of similar I-languages—which (sets) can roughly correspond to
geosociopolitical notions ’language’ and ’dialect’ (see Chomsky 1986, section 2)—
show recurrent (co)articulatory patterns. In our view, for example, the recurrent
difference in pronunciation of English [i] and German [i] is to be attributed to rep-
resentational (featural) differences present in I-languages of English and German
speakers, not to language-specific phonetics.12 In general, our position is that all
recurrent or linguistically relevant differences in pronunciation result from repre-
sentational differences in the lexicon and from differences in the phonological rule
component. This position is parallel to the Minimalist idea that cross-linguistic
syntactic differences arise from differences in lexicon and functional heads, and not
from languages having different syntaxes (Chomsky 1995).
4.3. The Implementational Level
The implementational level is concerned with the neurobiological substrate of CP
(see Figure 5). How is transduction of features at the PPI instantiated in the human
brain? Many mysteries still surround this question and proposed answers are ever-
changing. At a relatively gross neuroanatomical level, speech production engages a
widely distributed neural network. In a meta-analysis of overt speech production,
Eickhoff et al. (2009) reported consistent activation in left inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG), ventral precentral gyrus (motor and premotor cortex), ventral postcentral
gyrus (somatosensory cortex), superior temporal gyrus (STG; i.e., auditory cortex),
supplementary motor area (SMA), anterior insula, superior paravermal cerebellum
(lobules V and VI), basal ganglia and thalamus. Of particular importance for trans-
duction is the ‘dorsal stream’, usually stated to have an “auditory-motor integration
function” (Hickok & Poeppel 2007: 394) and to be “involved in mapping sound rep-
resentations onto articulatory-based representations” (Hickok & Poeppel 2004: 72).
12 A reviewer raises the question of how many features would be needed in our approach in
order to describe “minute differences between neighboring dialects”, for example “the differ-
ences between the English accents in the US”, arguing that the twenty-something features that
are usually assumed to exist are not enough. The objection is mathematically unjustified since
assuming 20 features (Odden 2013) and surface underspecification (Hale & Kissock 2007) will
yield 320 (≈ 3.5 billion) different segments that can feed CP, which seems to be more than
enough not only for the description of a non-technical notion such as ‘English accents in the
US’, but also for accounting for all possible recurrent (co)articulatory patterns. Of course, any
increase in the feature set, even one that maintains the same order of magnitude as the usually
assumed ‘20 or so’, yields explosive increases in descriptive typological power: For example,
30 features yield 330 which is about 206 trillion different segments. The reviewer’s worries
reflect the normal human lack of intuition with respect to combinatoric explosion. Any lin-
ear increase in what we attribute to UG results in exponential growth in descriptive capacity,
clearly a welcome result (Reiss 2012).
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The dorsal stream is comprised of structures in the posterior frontal lobe and the
posterior dorsal-most part of the temporal lobe and parietal operculum. The dorsal
stream is strongly left-dominant, which is why production deficits result predom-
inantly from dorsal temporal and frontal lesions. The specifics of these general
findings lend support for various aspects of CP.
The articulatory motor programs for executing features are coded in posterior
IFG of the left hemisphere, traditionally known as Broca’s area. More specifically,
Hickok (2012: 138) reports that pars opercularis (BA44) and the ventral-most part
of BA6 store articulatory programs needed to reach the auditory targets imposed
by features. BA44 and BA6 are thus the most likely candidates for storing articula-
tory aspects of features (see Figure 6). The anterior insula, a cortical area beneath
the frontal and temporal lobes of the left hemisphere, is reported to be involved in
preparation of speech, that is, in “translating a phonetic ‘concept’ obtained from
left IFG into articulatory motor patterns” (Blumstein & Baum 2016: 649, Eickhoff et
al. 2009), roughly corresponding to our A1. Dronkers (1996) showed that lesions
to that part of the brain lead to apraxia of speech, the inability to assign muscu-
lar activity to a phonological representation. Dronkers’ results are rather robust
and show a clear disruption of A1, since all 25 examined stroke patients suffering
from apraxia of speech had the same lesion, while the anterior insula was spared
in all 19 healthy participants. By way of the dorsal stream, information from the
anterior insula is transmitted to the pre-SMA, often implicated in articulatory initi-
ation and sequencing of neuromuscular activity (Alario et al. 2006, Guenther et al.
2006, Bohland & Guenther 2006), and then projected to the primary motor cortex.
The pre-SMA also receives temporal information from the cerebellum and the basal
ganglia (see below). It can therefore be hypothesized that the pre-SMA integrates
information from A1 and A2, and forms a finalized True Phonetic Representation.
From the primary motor cortex, neurons send signals to the brainstem and spinal
cord that ultimately result in muscle contractions.
Important structures for the temporal organization of speech (corresponding
to A2) include the cerebellum and basal ganglia. Information from the insula (cor-
responding to A1) is directly transmitted to the cerebellum and basal ganglia, struc-
tures that are well-established constituents of cortical-subcortical loops for move-
ment preparation (Jueptner & Krukenberg 2001). More specifically, selection and
sequencing of motor programs for articulation is mediated through basal ganglia,
and the conversion of the discretely prepared sequences into a fluent, temporally
distributed action is carried out by the cerebellum (Eickhoff et al. 2009: 2416). Cere-
bellar dysfunction affects temporal aspects of speech production and results in a
dysarthria characterized by improper timing of cognitively discrete elements (such
as feature bundles), substantial aberrations in their total and relative duration, dis-
rupted coordination of orofacial and laryngeal movements, slowed/delayed exe-
cution of articulatory movements etc. (Ackerman et al. 2007). Information from the
cerebellum and basal ganglia ties into the pre-SMA, presumably where A1 and A2
are integrated to form a True Phonetic Representation directly interpretable by the
primary motor cortex (PMC) which sends efferent neuromuscular commands.13
13 According to Eickhoff et al.:
The basal ganglia and the cerebellum both forward their information to the
PMC which precedes M1 in a serial fashion. The parallel engagement of the
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Features also have acoustic correlates (see Figure 6) that serve as targets for
articulatory movements. There is accumulating evidence and a convergence of
opinion that portions of the superior temporal sulcus (STS)—bilaterally but per-
haps with a mild leftward bias—are important for encoding acoustic/auditory as-
pects of phonological representations (Indefrey & Levelt 2004, Buchsbaum et al.
2001). In an attempt to pinpoint this region more narrowly, Hickok & Poeppel
(2007: 398) suggest “that the crucial portion of the STS that is involved in phonolog-
ical-level processes is bounded anteriorly by the most anterolateral aspect of Hes-
chl’s gyrus and posteriorly by the posterior-most extent of the Sylvian fissure”.
Mesgarani et al. (2014) showed that acoustic phonetic information is represented
in the STS and is distributed along five distinct areas, each roughly corresponding
to a general ‘manner of articulation’ class of speech sounds. By measuring the re-
sponses in implanted electrical cortical grids placed along the superior-most part
of the temporal gyrus, they found that their electrode e1 responded selectively to
stops, e2 to sibilant fricatives, e3 to low back vowels, e4 to high front vowels and
a palatal glide, and e5 to nasals (Mesgarani et al. 2014: 1009). Similarly, Bouchard
et al. (2013) constructed an auditory-based ‘place of articulation’ cortical map in
the STG, confirming labial, coronal and dorsal ’places’ with different electrodes,
and cutting across various manner classifications. Scharinger et al. (2012) found,
using magnetoencephalography, neural correlates of three phonologically relevant
vowel variables—height, frontness and roundness spelled in terms of first three
formants—again localizing them in the superior temporal gyrus.
STS and STG project auditory representations to an area in the Sylvian fis-
sure at the boundary between the parietal and temporal lobes (called ‘Spt’), where
they are integrated with articulatory representations (Hickok et al. 2009, 2011, Gow
2012). Activity in Spt is highly correlated with activity in the pars opercularis
(Buchsbaum et al. 2001, 2005), the posterior sector of Broca’s region implicated in
storage of articulatory motor programs. White matter tracts identified via diffusion
tensor imaging suggest that Spt and the pars opercularis are densely connected
neuroanatomically (Hickok et al. 2009). Spt therefore appears to be involved in
sensorimotor integration, that is, in translation between auditory and articulatory
correlates of features.
4.4. Interim Summary
At the beginning of this section, we stated that the main goal of this paper is to gain
a better understanding of how phonological features relate to neurobiological struc-
tures. Let us summarize our proposals. Recent neuroscience evidence is consistent
with the idea that Cognitive Phonetics transduces abstract features (elements of
SRs) into temporally distributed neuromuscular activities (elements of PRs), relat-
ing the phonological grammar to the vastly different SM system. This is carried
subcortical motor loops is thus followed by a sequentially organized common
final pathway: the PMC first combines the processed information about selected
movement programs and their temporal sequencing provided by the basal gan-
glia and the cerebellum, respectively, into a final movement representation. These
are then forwarded to M1 for the generation of the final output to lower motor
neurons and hence execution. (Eickhoff et al. 2009: 2416; emphasis added)
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out by assigning each feature a specific set of muscular contractions (A1) and by
ordering them temporally (A2). Neurolinguistic evidence outlined in section 4.3
suggests that transduction is implemented by a widely distributed neural network
which engages the inferior frontal gyrus (stores articulatory correlates), the supe-
rior temporal gyrus (stores auditory correlates), the Spt (sensorimotor integration),
the anterior insula (A1), the cerebellum and basal ganglia (A2), the supplementary
motor area (integrates A1 and A2), and the primary motor cortex (sends efferent
neural commands to the muscles).
5. Implications
We have stressed the importance of adhering to phonological facts in phonetic the-
orizing because decisions made on phonological grounds will have considerable
impact on phonetic analysis. In particular, this means that we take serious consid-
eration of the following notions: (1) the most basic unit of phonology is the dis-
tinctive feature; (2) features are abstract (yet real), cognitive, substance-free units;
and (3) features are transduced at the phonology-phonetics interface (PPI) by being
converted into temporally coordinated muscular activity. Several theoretical and
empirical implications follow from Cognitive Phonetics (CP), our theory of this in-
terface.
5.1. Coarticulation
The concept of coarticulation, such as the lip rounding during production of [s] be-
fore the rounded vowel of soon, rests upon two premises: (a) that discrete units, seg-
ments, underlie the continuous, gradient speech signal (Hammarberg 1976: 357),
and (b) that these segments are converted into articulatory gestures (Farnetani &
Recasens 2013: 317f).14 The temporal overlapping of articulatory gestures pertain-
ing to different linearly ordered segments can thus be dubbed ‘intersegmental coar-
ticulation’. However, if premise (a) is modified to be in line with much of modern
phonology (see section 3.1), that is, if the phonological feature is taken as the atomic
underlying unit, it follows that (c) features are converted into something more basic
than segment-bound articulatory gestures (see section 4.2), and (d) that interaction
in realization of features within a single segment is also possible, leading to what
we will call ‘intrasegmental coarticulation’. Here we will briefly sketch the conse-
quence of approaching coarticulation from the framework of CP, assuming (c) and
(d) instead of (just) the usual (a) and (b).
CP performs the mapping SR → PR, or, in terms of individual valued fea-
tures, [F]→ PR[F]. We will therefore take transduced features (in a general format
PR[F], where [F] stands for an individual valued feature) to be the basic units that
enter speech production. To illustrate intrasegmental coarticulation, consider the
interaction of PR[HIGH] and PR[NASAL] observed, for example, in Lakhota (Boas &
Deloria 1941), Yoruba (Ogunbowale 1970), and Koyra Chiini (Heath 1999), with
sketches in Figure 7 based on Beddor (1983) and Ladefoged & Johnson (2010).
14 Even Carol Fowler, who disagreed with Hammarberg on many issues related to coarticula-
tion (see Fowler 1983) and who later argued for a gesture-based account of coarticulation (see
Fowler & Saltzman 1993), stated that “an intuitive concept of ‘segment’ underlies our recog-
276 V. Volenec & C. Reiss
Figure 7: Intrasegmental coarticulation based on the interaction of PR[NASAL] and PR[HIGH].
In principle, PR[+NASAL] entails the opening of the velar port and PR[+HIGH]
the raising of the tongue dorsum. In sketch (1) PR[+NASAL] can be observed in a
‘default’, non-coarticulated state, that is, with a substantial degree of velum lower-
ing. The tongue dorsum is not raised due to PR[–HIGH], leaving more space in the
oral cavity for the velum port to open. In (2) PR[+HIGH] pushes the tongue dorsum
upward, leaving less space for the velum to lower.15
The velar port is still opened as the realization of PR[+NASAL], but to a sub-
stantially lesser extent than in (1). In other words, PR[NASAL] is coarticulated with
PR[HIGH] and shows variation depending on the specification (+ or –) of PR[HIGH].
This effect can be observed by comparing how features are transduced within dif-
ferent segments; PR[NASAL] and PR[HIGH] interact differently within, say, [a˜] than
within [u˜]. Such variation in how individual features within a segment’s feature
matrix are transduced depending on the specification of other features in the ma-
trix is ‘intrasegmental coarticulation’, as illustrated in Figure 7. This is distinct from
variation in transduction of features due to influence of features from other ma-
trixes, which constitutes ‘intersegmental coarticulation’.
In CP, intrasegmental coarticulation results from the workings of A1, while
intersegmental coarticulation arises from the effects of A2. As defined in section
4.2, A1 takes a feature from the phonological SR and converts it into a neuromuscu-
nition that there is a phenomenon of coarticulation requiring explanation.” (Fowler 1980: 114)
15 Hajek & Maeda (2000: 6) offer a different explanation as to why the velum is lowered to a
lesser degree if the tongue body is elevated compared to when the tongue body is not elevated.
They argue that a given velopharyngeal opening has a greater acoustic effect in high vowels
because the oral tract is more constricted, and as a result, less velum lowering is required in
high vowels in order to realize perceptible nasalization.
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lar pattern. For each feature, this pattern is partially determined by specifications
of other features within the same bundle, as shown in Figure 7. Therefore, A1 will
assign a different neuromuscular pattern to [+NASAL] depending on how the fea-
ture [HIGH] is specified. If one imagines a certain SR (say, [d6g]) as a feature matrix
where columns stand for segments and rows for features, then A1 takes all columns
(that were loaded into CP) at once, determines the specification of each feature
in each column, and generates a full set of corresponding PR[F]s. Intrasegmental
coarticulation, that is, contextual variation in transduction of features, arises when
different features in the same column impose conflicting demands on A1. Informa-
tion from A1, transmitted via a pathway connecting anterior insula to cerebellum
and basal ganglia, is further manipulated by A2. A2 arranges PR[F]s created by
A1 temporally, but more importantly for this discussion, A2 extends certain PR[F]s
over boundaries of their original column. This leads to intersegmental coarticu-
lation. A familiar example is labial intersegmental coarticulation, where A2 takes
PR[+ROUND], typically originating from a rounded vowel, and overextends it in the
regressive (anticipatory) direction. This can be observed in the word soon, where
PR[+ROUND] from the vowel is overextended to produce a labialized fricative. A2
can also overextend PR[F]s in the progressive (perseverative) direction. This can be
observed in the word seek, where the PR[–BACK] of [i] is overextended to influence
the following [k], yielding ♪si: ♪, with a somewhat fronted velar stop.16 Neurobio-
logical studies suggest (see section 4.3) that the results of A1 and A2 are integrated
into a final true phonetic representation in a region of the supplementary motor
cortex at its boundary with the primary motor cortex, from which efferent com-
mands are issued to the musculature of speech organs. However, it would seem
that further experimentation is needed in order to establish whether A1 precedes
A2 or whether there is overlapping in their real-time neural implementation.
A great deal of variation in the execution of PR[F]s is of course to be ex-
pected among speakers, especially given that after transduction, various other non-
linguistic and non-phonetic factors influence the actual acoustic output of the hu-
man body. The output of CP is dependent on utterance-specific SRs that feed it
and on the neurophysiological structures that serve as its physical implementation.
Various other situational factors are introduced after transduction, which we have
put aside due to their irrelevance for the general nature of CP, but it is important to
keep in mind that, if not somehow recognized, these factors will ‘contaminate’ all
experimental results (of neural imaging techniques, for example), thus leading to
the impression of even greater variation in observed speech output.
The architecture of CP opens the possibility of simultaneously exploring coar-
ticulation along two dimensions instead of just one, which leads to interesting em-
pirical consequences. Here we will merely state a hypothetical situation to illustrate
CP’s potential empirical coverage.
Let us suppose that in some language we have detected that PR[+ROUND] is
different in [u] than in [o] (see Linker (1982) for analogous examples from English,
Cantonese, Finnish, French, and Swedish). In other words, A1 assigns a slightly dif-
ferent configuration to [+ROUND] depending on whether it has to take into account
[+HIGH] or [–HIGH] within the same bundle. This kind of intrasegmental coarticu-
lation can clearly be observed in Figure 8.
16 The symbol ♪ represents the actual acoustic output of the human body.
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Figure 8: Intrasegmental labial coarticulation. Notice the difference in lip rounding corresponding
to [u] on the left, and to [o] on the right.
Suppose further that A2 temporally overextends PR[+ROUND] across the seg-
mental boundary in the anticipatory direction (from ‘right’ to ‘left’). Intrasegmental
and intersegmental coarticulation of the same PR[F] is now ineffect. Consider, for
example, the tokens [lwu:k] and [lwo:k]. The [lw] of the former token and the [lw]
of the latter token will systematically differ, since PR[+ROUND] of the former will
carry with it the effect of intrasegmental coarticulation due to A1, namely, the ef-
fect of PR[+HIGH], while the latter will carry the effect of PR[–HIGH]. To reiterate,
intersegmental coarticulation reflects the effects of intrasegmental coarticulation. If
we consider only SRs, then there can be no explanation for a systematic difference
in the realization of the rounding on the two [l]s, since in both cases [l] precedes
[+ROUND]. CP allows us to account for these subtle phonetic variations in an explicit
and straightforward way—they follow naturally from its transduction algorithms.
Thus, A1 and A2 are not just mechanisms that transduce features into information
directly interpretable by the SM system, they are also mechanisms from which both
types of coarticulation follow automatically, simply by adhering to the minimal ar-
chitecture of CP.
Our discussion has focused on the variable neuromuscular realization of a
given property, such as the rounding of the vowels [u] and [o]. It is worth remem-
bering that such a discussion of phonetic variability is predicated upon acceptance
of the existence of a logically prior phonological category of vowels containing the
feature [+ROUND]—it only makes sense to talk about variable realizations of x once
we accept that x is a category.17 Why do we accept the existence of such a cate-
gory? Because the two segments [o] and [u] behave alike with respect to linguistic
phenomena. For example, in Turkish, a process called ‘vowel harmony’ generates
different suffix vowels depending on the preceding root vowel. As we see in Table
1, the [+ROUND] root vowels [u] and [o] both trigger a suffix form with [u], whereas
17 This is an extension to the feature level of Hammarberg’s (1976) argument for phonological
segments as “logically and epistemologically prior” to their phonetic correlates.
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the corresponding [–ROUND] vowels [W] and [A] trigger a suffix form with [W] (see
Isac & Reiss (2013, section 6.4) for a more comprehensive analysis).
Table 1: Schematic of vowel harmony as found in Turkish.
As the photographs (of
a Turkish speaker) in Fig-
ure 8 show, the lip round-
ing on two vowels is real-
ized differently, but we treat
the vowels as members of
a category [+ROUND] because
of their phonological behav-
ior. Such considerations ex-
plain why we must recognize
a distinction between phonetics and phonology. Since the two domains are differ-
ent but interact with each other, there must be a transduction between them. That
transduction is CP.
We fully recognize that the properties of CP outlined in this paper are too
general to serve immediately as a full model of coarticulation. Not only the prop-
erties of the two component transduction algorithms, A1 and A2, but also the basic
inventory of distinctive features must be made more explicit if CP is to be an em-
pirically testable model. In principle, however, CP offers a theoretically coherent
way to account for both intra- and inter-segmental coarticulation, and their com-
plex interactions, while maintaining theoretical and empirical insights of genera-
tive phonology.
5.2. The (Illusory) Naturalness of Phonological Processes
The nature of the PPI as understood in CP shows the need to strictly distinguish be-
tween phonology and phonetics. This has implications for the idea of ‘naturalness’
in phonology. Naturalness is an elusive notion, but it usually entails explaining
linguistic phenomena in terms of directly observable empirical facts grounded in
acoustics, articulation, statistics, behavior, communication etc. Donegan & Stampe
(1979), proponents of Natural Phonology, suggest that the same notion of nat-
uralness plays a role in explaining synchronic phonological patterns, diachronic
phonology, as well as patterns of speech development in children:
Natural Phonology is a modern development of the oldest explanatory
theory of phonology. [. . . ] Its basic thesis is that the living sound pat-
terns of language, in their development in each individual as well as
in their evolution over the centuries, are governed by forces implicit in
human vocalization and perception. (Donegan & Stampe 1979: 126)
We follow Hale (2007, section 11.1) in denying any significance to apparent parallels
among synchronic, diachronic and developmental ‘sound patterns’, therefore we
will restrict our discussion to the ‘naturalness’ of synchronic phonology, as deter-
mined by phonetic facts. It is not difficult to find, on superficial inspection, phono-
logical processes that seem natural in this sense. Why does [s] assimilate in voicing
before adjacent [b] in a language L? Because it is easier for the human vocal system
to maintain, and not to rapidly change the laryngeal configuration. Since voicing
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assimilation is indubitably a well-attested phonological process, and since this pro-
cess receives an explanation from the efficient workings of “human vocalization”
(Donegan & Stampe 1979: 126), naturalness must obviously be a part of phonology.
However, this reasoning suffers from a failure of separating ‘what’ from ‘why’. The
‘what’ and the ‘why’ do not have the same status in linguistic theory. If the goal
of linguistics, phonology included, is to explicitly model the speaker’s knowledge
of language, that is, to model linguistic competence, then linguistics, phonology
included, is to be concerned with the ‘what’ questions: ‘What is it that a speaker
knows when she or he is said to know phonology?’ and ‘What are the rules and
representation of particular phonological grammars?’ The ‘why’ question—‘Why
is phonology (or some aspect of it) the way it is?’—does not enter into discussion at
this level of inquiry (but see below). Simply put, ‘what’ is part of competence, but
‘why’ is not.
Donegan & Stampe (1979), and many other phonologists more recently, pro-
posed to offer phonetic explanations for phonological phenomena, but despite on-
going efforts in a variety of phonological frameworks (for example, see Hayes et
al. (2004) for attempts within Optimality Theory), this enterprise has not been con-
vincing:
The attempts by those who are interested in psychological phonologi-
cal grammars and in finding ways to represent phonological processes
[. . . ] in phonetically natural ways have been abysmal failures [. . . ]. One
possible solution to this is not to put more phonetic sophistication into
psychological grammars but rather to abandon phonetic naturalness as
a necessary feature of them. (Ohala 2003: 685)
Ohala’s perspective (see also Ohala 1990) is not only that efforts to build naturalness
into phonology have failed, but also that we would not want them to succeed, on
grounds of scientific elegance. If certain recurrent phonological phenomena have
a perfectly good phonetic explanation, then we do not get a better theory by du-
plicating the explanation inside phonological grammar—in science, it is not better
to have two explanations than one. If naturalness (e.g., the prevalence of voicing
assimilation) receives a perfectly fine phonetic explanation, then it is not better to
posit another, quasi-phonological explanation, especially not if the latter explana-
tion offers no new insight.
We suggest that phonological naturalness is an illusion that arises when in-
specting phonetic data with the purpose of understanding phonological processes. In
other words, ‘naturalness’ is introduced into data in the process of externalization
(and internalization in speech perception). Since we cannot have direct access to
phonological representations and computations, all of our observations are of pho-
netic data, that is, data from actual utterances resulting from language use, which
reflects many different factors. As we argued in sections 3 and 4, CP is the first step
in externalization, so understanding CP can hopefully provide insight into what is
mistakenly taken as phonological naturalness. Attaining such an insight removes
the need for attributing naturalness to the phonological grammar, leading to a more
parsimonious and elegant phonological theory.
Once we remove the traditional ‘why’ questions of Natural Phonology and its
derivatives from the purview of phonology, we will be better prepared to answer the
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proper ‘why’ questions related to the phonological domain. At this level of inquiry,
we will be uncovering the biological foundations, not of speech, but of language,
the study of which is Universal Grammar. The ‘why’ questions of the phonologi-
cal grammar are answerable only in terms of the neurobiological substrate of the
phonological faculty.
5.3. Gradience
Phonology is computation over discrete, categorical symbols. At the lowest tax-
onomic level, these symbols are features. However, the phonological literature is
full of case studies showing the graded nature of ‘phonological’ units and processes
(see Ernestus 2011 for an informative survey). We believe that the rejection of dis-
creteness in phonology reflects a failure to distinguish the object of study from the
data used to draw inferences about that object.
The following is a fairly standard definition of ‘categoricality’ vs. ‘gradience’,
and by emphasizing certain words in it, we wish to draw the reader’s attention to
the conceptual level at which the definition is given:
[C]ategorical sounds [. . . ] are stable and represent clear distinct phono-
logical categories (e.g. sounds showing all characteristics of voiced seg-
ments throughout their realizations) [. . . ]; gradient sounds [. . . ] may
change during their realization and may simultaneously represent dif-
ferent phonological categories (e.g. sounds that start as voiced and end
as voiceless). (Ernestus 2011: 2115)
While we have no objection to such a characterization of categoricality vs. gradi-
ence, from the emphasized words it is obvious that the definition is immersed in
the domain of the substance-laden and temporal, that is, speech (performance), not
grammar (competence). The problem arises when phonetic data is used to make
inferences about phonology directly and reflexively, as if every idiosyncratic da-
tum recorded in speech or found in a corpus is relevant for phonology, without
acknowledging the distance between competence and performance. Consider an-
other passage from Ernestus (2011: 2118):
Ellis and Hardcastle (2002) found [by using electropalatography and
electromagnetic articulography—vv & cr] that four of their eight En-
glish speakers showed categorical place assimilation of /n/ to follow-
ing velars in all tokens, two speakers showed either no or categorical
assimilation, and two speakers showed gradient assimilation. Together,
the data show that place assimilation processes [. . . ] may be gradient in
nature. These processes cannot simply be accounted for by the categor-
ical spreading of a phonological feature from one segment to another.
What is to be inferred from these findings that is relevant for phonology? In our
view, very little (see below). The cited results, showing inter- and intra-speaker
variation, as well as both discrete and gradient effects, may constitute a salient illus-
tration of the ubiquitous lack of uniformity in the behavior of members of a speech
community, but it is not in the purview of phonology to provide an explanation of
such phenomena. The fact that such variation ”cannot simply be accounted for by
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the categorical spreading of a phonological feature from one segment to another”
(ibid.), a claim most certainly true, does not automatically mean there is something
wrong with phonology conceived as categorical symbol manipulation. It is impor-
tant to clearly distinguish between the object of study of phonology and the sources
of evidence for that study. The object of phonological study is the human knowl-
edge of externalizable aspects of I-language and the cognitive capacity required to
construct that knowledge on exposure to limited experience. One of the sources of
evidence, perhaps the primary one, bearing upon that object of inquiry are spoken
utterances. Therefore, to a certain degree, it can be said that both phonology and
phonetics draw from the same pool of evidence, namely, the analysis of speech.
The point is merely that not all data from that pool is relevant for phonology, and a
phonologist qua cognitive scientist needs to peel off the various complications that
were introduced in the process of externalization from the underlying system of
linguistic knowledge she or he is studying.
As understood here, gradience is introduced by CP’s A2, which is responsible
for the temporal coordination of muscular activity specified by A1; that is, gradi-
ence is not a phonological phenomenon. Notice the references to time highlighted
in the above quote from Ernestus (2011: 2118), for example, “during” and “start as
. . . end as”. Gradience involves change over time. If we think of human phonol-
ogy as involving a representational system (features and the like) that encodes the
phonological portion of morphemes stored in the lexicon, and a computational sys-
tem that can be thought of as a complex function of, say, composed rules (Bale
& Reiss 2018), then there is no temporal aspect to phonology. (Questions about
gradience in phonology are like questions about how fast a wh-element moves in
syntax; both reflect a category error.) In this way phonology mirrors other compe-
tence modules, for the same reasons discussed at length by Chomsky (1980, 1986,
1988, 2000a), Anderson & Lightfoot (2002), and others. A fundamental property of
the human language faculty is that on all analytical levels it fractionates language-
related aspects of an analog signal into discrete elements to which formal opera-
tions apply.18 Even vastly different, mostly incompatible linguistic theories have
acknowledged discreteness as a defining property of language: It can be found in
Martinet’s (1949: 30) notion of ‘Double Articulation’, Hockett’s (1959: 32) ‘Duality
of Patterning’, Chomsky’s (2016: 4) ‘Basic Property’. Adopting such a position not
only preserves a clear distinction between competence and performance, a neces-
sity on many different grounds, but it also facilitates disentangling phonological
conclusions from phonetic conclusions even though both are drawn from the same
data. The only kind of conclusion a phonologist can draw from the Ellis & Hardcas-
tle experiment cited by Ernestus is that the I-language of (some) English speakers
contains a following rule: [+NASAL, CORONAL]→ [+NASAL, DORSAL] / [DORSAL].
Phonologists can draw only this kind of conclusions because their theory both pro-
vides and determines the limits of their descriptive vocabulary. Phonological the-
ory does not provide us with the vocabulary to describe a nasal consonant as ‘kind
of dorsal’. We pointed out above (section 5.1) that [o] and [u] behave phonologi-
cally the same, and that both must be analyzed as [+ROUND] vowels, despite the
involvement of different muscles in realizing this feature, due to intrasegmental
18 “Our mind structures the linguistic input in a digital form (as opposed to an analog form),
and we call this property of language discreteness.” (Boeckx 2009: 57)
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coarticulation with [–HIGH] and [+HIGH], respectively. Again, phonologists do not
have, and do not want, the vocabulary to describe a segment as ‘kind of round’.19
If a featural assimilation rule correctly models a part of the implicit phono-
logical knowledge of a speaker, a phonetician can then posit hypotheses as to why
such a pattern exists, why there is variability in externalization of this knowledge,
what are the limits of its variation, whether the variation is purely biomechanical or
partly/mostly/solely cognitive, and so on. For example, the first of these questions
might be explained by arguing that the demands of the PR[+DORSAL] override the
demands of the PR[+CORONAL] because of the robustness and mechanical inertness
of the relatively massive dorsal part of the tongue compared to less constrained,
more mobile coronal part.20 Therefore, the velar exerts its coarticulatory influence
over the nasal. Taken this way, the relationship between assimilation and coarticu-
lation is parallel to that of phonology and phonetics in general, that is, the former is
a discretely and abstractly constructed mental representation of or an implicit knowl-
edge of the latter (provided that the latter has been phonologized).
In brief, the data most often used in inferring about phonology comes from
spoken utterances. But spoken utterances are not the object of phonological study.
Therefore, it does not follow that gradience of phonetic objects automatically trans-
lates to gradience of phonological objects.
5.4. Speech Planning and the Case of the Intervocalic /j/ in Croatian
Anticipatory coarticulation is widely adduced as proof that coarticulation is not
merely a reflection of biomechanical properties (e.g., inertness) of speech organs
(Farnetani & Recasens 2013). In order for a coarticulatory effect of, say, labialization
([w]) to influence a unit preceding a rounded vowel from which the effect derives,
it is necessary that some cognitive planning is involved. As we see it, phonology
provides the knowledge about the discretely constructed form about to be loaded
into the speech production mechanism, and CP the means to plan the coarticulatory
effect. An example may be drawn from findings presented by Volenec (2013).
The purpose of that study was to see whether there is a statistically significant
difference between the acoustic properties of a Croatian intervocalic palatal glide [j]
present in the underlying representation, as in /pijem/→ [pijem] ‘I am drinking’,
and a (supposedly) epenthesized palatal glide that is not present underlyingly, as
in /vidio/ → [vidijo] ‘I saw’. In the latter case, the glide is supposed to surface
only when adjacent to a front vowel (Sˇkaric´ 2007: 75), therefore only intervocalic
environments consisting of at least one front vowel were compared. For the com-
parison the study used minimal or subminimal pairs such as /gleda ix/ ‘he looks
at them’ ∼ /gledaj ix/ ‘look at them’, and /priañati/ ‘to stick (to)’ ∼ /prijaViti/ ‘to
report’. The first result was that in both cases none of the typical acoustic correlates
of palatal glides (lowering of F1 and heightening of F2 compared to adjacent vow-
19 The idea that one’s theoretical apparatus determines the range of possible observations that
can be made is an old idea in the philosophy of science, discussed in particular reference to
the domains of phonetics and phonology by Hammarberg (1976) and Bale & Reiss (2018).
20 This is the main idea behind the ‘degree of articulatory constraint’ (DAC) model of lingual
coarticulation (Recasens et al. 1997), which states that the degree of coarticulatory influence
and resistance of a phonetic unit rises in proportion to the degree of tongue dorsum involve-
ment in the production of that unit.
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els, lowering of the intensity between F1 and F2; see Stevens 1998, section 9.2.1)
were found in the intervocalic position. This would suggest that the correct deriva-
tions are actually /pijem/→ [piem] and /vidio/→ [vidio], that is, with deletion,
not epenthesis intervocalically. However, the second result showed that in words
with underlying /j/, vowels preceding the palatal glide had their F1 significantly
lowered, suggesting that the glide exerted anticipatory coarticulatory influence on
the vowel, despite not being otherwise present in the acoustic signal. In words with
no underlying /j/, this lowering of F1 of the preceding vowel was not present.
We argue that this case shows a dissociation between three levels of analysis:
phonological, cognitive phonetic, and articulatory phonetic. Since there is no in-
controvertible evidence of discrete phonological alternations in any of these cases,
the most plausible derivations are /pijem/ → [pijem] and /vidio/ → [vidio], de-
spite the fact that the spectrogram corresponding to [pijem] contains no time span
that independently corresponds to a segment [j]. Note that segments are abbrevia-
tions for feature bundles. The A1 of CP receives features and transduces them into
PR[F]s. Identical adjacent PR[F]s are fused to make a continuum; the palatal glide
and front vowels share many distinctive features, and therefore many PR[F]s. CP’s
A2 temporally overextends the only PR[F] discriminating between the glide and
front vowels—the neuromuscular command responsible for the narrowing of the
palatal constriction, which results in the lowering of F1—to serve as an acoustic cue
for the glide. The articulatory system then produces something like ♪piem♪, but
with ♪i♪’s F1 lowered (as compared to a ‘normal’ /i/ that is not in the context of an
underlying /j/). The hearer usually picks up this cue, which explains why native
Croatian speakers consistently report vaguely hearing some sort of [j] in these cases
(Sˇkaric´ 2008: 206–212).
Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, what enters the articulatory
system is not the output of phonology (which is [pijem]); if it were, we would expect
to find at least some independent glide-like acoustic properties between the vow-
els, but there are none. Therefore, a cognitive phonetic stage, distinct from both
phonology and articulatory phonetics, is needed for transduction and planning.
Second, the phonetic transformations that CP introduces target features, which cor-
respond to a finer level of granularity than segments. The phenomenon presented
here makes sense only if the input to CP consists of features, and not indivisible
segments; and if the output of CP does not consist of segment-bound articulatory
gestures, but PR[F]s. This suggests that neither articulatory gestures nor segments,
but transduced features (PR[F]s) are the basic units of speech production. The ap-
parent necessity of units at this intervening level serves as yet another justification
of our CP model.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that the interface between phonology and phonetics
(PPI) consists of a transduction process that converts elementary units of phono-
logical computation, features, into temporally specified neuromuscular patterns,
which are directly interpretable by the motor system of speech production. Our in-
quiry is inspired by Lenneberg’s magisterial book Biological Foundations of Language
(1967), in which he discussed the transformation of phones (segments) into neu-
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romuscular schemata. Our view of the PPI is constrained by substance-free gen-
erative phonological assumptions (section 3.1), on the one hand, and by insights
gained from psycholinguistic and phonetic models of speech production (section
3.2), on the other. To distinguish transduction of abstract phonological units into
planned neuromuscular patterns, arguably the very first step in speech production,
from the biomechanics of speech production usually associated with physiological
(or more narrowly, articulatory) phonetics, we have termed our theory ‘Cognitive
Phonetics’ (CP). The inner workings of CP (section 4) are described in terms of
Marr’s (1982/2010) tri-level approach, which we used to construct a ‘bridge’ from a
formal phonological model to activity one might plausibly find in a human nervous
system. In order to connect the substance-free and timeless (phonology) with the
substance-laden and temporally coordinated (the SM system used in speech), CP
takes features of phonological SRs and relates them to neuromuscular activity (A1)
and arranges that activity temporally (A2), thus generating an array of information
(in a format which we call ‘True Phonetic Representation’) directly interpretable by
the SM system. We have also presented some potential neurobiological correlates
of various parts of CP (section 4.3). Finally, we have explored some of the implica-
tions of CP (section 5), showing how such an approach might inform the study of
certain phonetic phenomena, most notably coarticulation, and suggesting that CP
provides better explanations of some phenomena often considered to fall within
the purview of phonology, such as phonetic naturalness and gradience.
Further development of CP as an explanatory model of coarticulation and
other PPI phenomena will require sharpening the details of both steps of the trans-
duction algorithm (A1 and A2) and of CP’s output units (PF[F]). We posit CP as
a model intervening between phonology (grammar) and physiological phonetics,
and it is not surprising that such ideas have implications for the nature of the
adjacent systems. On the phonological side, CP calls for a reassessment of dis-
tinctive feature theory in a strict biolinguistic manner. Also, the transduction of
other aspects of phonological structure (e.g., prosody) should be explored. Ideally,
these further developments of CP should be driven by theoretically sound models
of phonological representation and computation on the one hand, and should be
grounded in neurobiological findings on the other, thus reducing the conceptual
distance between formal linguistics and cognitive neuroscience.
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